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SOLVING THE SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS
PAUL B. LARSEN*
ABSTRACT
Space debris is a growing public safety problem. As described
by the Kessler Syndrome,1 the increasing accumulation of debris
will soon hinder and eventually preclude access to outer space
unless the trend is swiftly reversed. The Inter-Agency Space Deb-
ris Coordination Committee’s (IADC) Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines, as adopted by the United Nations (UN) Committee
for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), are voluntary
but are enforced as mandatory regulations by major space pow-
ers; however, the guidelines only apply to new debris. The Euro-
pean Space Agency’s (ESA) 2017 Space Debris Conference
concluded that existing space debris guidelines are inadequate
and must be further strengthened in order to successfully con-
trol space debris.2
* The author taught air and space law for more than forty years respectively at
Southern Methodist University and at Georgetown University. He is co-author of
FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (2d ed. 2018), widely
used for teaching space law, and of PAUL B. LARSEN ET AL., AVIATION LAW, CASES
AND RELATED SOURCES (2d ed. 2012).
1 The Kessler Syndrome holds that space debris of critical mass will fragment
in further collisions leading to a cascading chain activity. See Donald J. Kessler &
Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Deb-
ris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637, 2637 (1978); see also STUFF IN SPACE, http://
stuffin.space/?intldes=1993-016CH&search=1993-016CH [https://perma.cc/
V9TJ-ARBQ] (STUFF IN SPACE is a real-time 3D map of objects in Earth orbit that
updates daily).
2 See 7th European Conference on Space Debris: Proceedings Database, EURO. SPACE
AGENCY (Apr. 18, 2017), https://conference.sdo.esoc.esa.int/proceedings/list
(last visited Sept. 4, 2018); see also Space Operations Space Debris: The ESA Approach,
EURO. SPACE AGENCY (Mar. 2017), http://www.esa.int/About_Us/ESA_Publica
tions/ESA_Publications_Brochures/ESA_BR-336_Space_Debris_The_ESA_Ap
proach [https://perma.cc/EF7P-JRQ5]; Solutions to Space Debris Problems Addressed
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An institutional problem is that the IADC, the committee that
originated the current space debris guidelines, is not a UN
body. It is an independent organization of the thirteen most ac-
tive national space agencies. It lacks geographical representa-
tion. The IADC has no legal authority to monitor, change, or
strengthen the international guidelines as debris accumulation
increases. Moreover, the IADC lacks legal enforcement author-
ity. This article will examine several possible alternatives for
stronger space debris control. These options are: (1) strength-
ened COPUOS debris regulations; (2) international space deb-
ris regulation by an international organization on the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) model; (3) in-
ternational space debris regulation by an international organiza-
tion on the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
model; (4) space debris regulation by a non-governmental or-
ganization; (5) bringing the IADC space debris activity into
COPUOS in the form of a third subcommittee; and (6) separate
international treaty regulation by and for the thirteen IADC
states in the absence of UN action.
Ultimately it is the responsibility of the individual states under
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) to authorize, super-
vise, and police their generation of space debris and to hold
operators responsible for debris.3 This article makes final
recommendations.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SPACE DEBRIS PROBLEM
SPACE DEBRIS is an unresolved problem. The amount ofdebris from past activities in space has accumulated to the
extent that there are several hundred thousand pieces of debris
in orbit,4 and the prospects for the old debris to be removed
3 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4 The total number of debris is unknown because only large pieces of debris
can be tracked. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 1. The Kessler Syndrome states that
large debris pieces constantly collide and fragment into yet smaller pieces, thus
increasing the total number. See id. Even small debris is dangerous. See, e.g., Jo-
hannes Van Zijl, Space Debris Hit the International Space Station Causing Small Crack
in Window, THE SCI. EXPLORER (May 13, 2016), http://thescienceexplorer.com/
technology/space-debris-hit-international-space-station-causing-small-crack-win
dow [https://perma.cc/9D7Q-S2K5]. The International Space Station has been
hit by small debris. Id. The tenfold increase in small satellites in outer space
causes concerns about chaos. See Yousaf Butt, Avoiding Collisions in Outer Space,
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from orbit are slim. Existing space law5 is of little deterrence
because it was established before space debris became generally
recognized as a major problem. In fact, existing space law is in
some ways a hindrance to the solution of the problem. Thus, the
debris of past space activities continues to multiply as it frag-
ments in accordance with the Kessler Syndrome.6 Kessler
predicts7 that, unless a drastic remedy is introduced, the ac-
cumulation of debris will eventually preclude access to outer
space. Most debris are too small to be tracked and are therefore
unavoidable. The International Space Station, which is naviga-
ble, has been required to change orbit to avoid collision with
debris twenty-five times.8
Space debris moves at a speed of 56,000 kilometers per hour.9
It can cause great damage to other objects in outer space. Space
debris also presents a risk of damage to activities on the surface
of the Earth. This deterioration is growing rapidly. The Iridium
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/
space-race-regulation.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
5 The relevant space law treaties include:
(1) Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3;
(2) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov.
12, 1947, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
Convention];
(3) Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Lia-
bility Convention];
(4) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T.
7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement];
(5) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Moon Agreement]; and
(6) Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, reprinted in
COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICA-
TION UNION ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 3–54 (2015)
http://search.itu.int/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/5.21
.61.en.100.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC8J-JMAX] [hereinafter ITU
Constitution].
6 See Kessler, supra note 1.
7 See id. at 2642.
8 See Humaid Alshamsi et al., As the Grapefruit Turns Sixty, It’s Time to Get Serious
About Clean Up in Outer Space, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 45, 51 (2018); see also Go¨ktug˘
Karacaliog˘lu, Impact of New Satellite Launch Trends on Orbit Debris, SPACE SAFETY
MAG. (June 2, 2016), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/im-
pact-new-satellite-launch-trends-orbital-debris/ [https://perma.cc/24DY-SFEB].
9 Matt Williams, Eye-Opening Numbers on Space Debris, UNIVERSE TODAY (Mar. 21,
2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-03-eye-opening-space-debris.html [https://
perma.cc/G7GB-ANLM].
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33 collision with a defunct Cosmos satellite in 2009 added more
than 2,000 large pieces of debris.10 An even larger amount of
debris was caused in 2007 by China’s deliberate destruction of a
defunct weather satellite.11 That resulted in about 3,000 pieces
of debris, most of which are still in orbit.12 One expert predicts
that collisions with functioning satellites will begin to happen
regularly beginning about the year 2036 and that the rate of
collisions can then be expected to increase gradually, ending
eventually with foreclosure to outer space.13 ESA’s 2017 Over-
view of Space Debris states that there may be as many as 750,000
space debris objects larger than one centimeter in outer space,
and the ESA Overview observes:
At typical collision speeds of 10km/s in low orbits, impacts by
millimetre-sized objects could cause local damage or disable a
subsystem of an operating satellite. Collisions with debris larger
than 1 cm could disable an operational satellite or could cause
the break-up of a satellite or rocket body. And impact by debris
larger than about 10 cm can lead to a catastrophic break-up: the
complete destruction of a spacecraft and generation of a debris
cloud.14
The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines15 are the only
remedial scheme yet produced with a significant positive effect
on space debris accumulation. The guidelines aim to mitigate
the adverse consequence of space debris by identifying and pub-
lishing known ways to mitigate space debris.16 However, the
guidelines only reduce the amount of new debris. They do not
resolve the existing debris problem, which continues to in-
crease. Only actual removal of debris would resolve the space




13 See Karacaliog˘lu, supra note 8; see also Space Smash: Simulating When Satellites
Collide, EURO. SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineer
ing_Technology/Space_smash_simulating_when_satellites_collide [https://per
ma.cc/8AMP-9F5T].
14 See Space Operations Space Debris: The ESA Approach, supra note 2, at Overview
of Space Debris.
15 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., IADC Space Debris Mitiga-
tion Guidelines, IADC-02-01 1, 1 (Sept. 2007), http://www.unoosa.org/docu-
ments/pdf/spacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-IADC-Space_Debris-Guidelines-Revision1
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MH5-6JWX] [hereinafter IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines].
16 Id. at 3.
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debris problem.17 Furthermore the guidelines are voluntary and
depend on the individual states for adoption, monitoring, and
enforcement.18
The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines were authored by the
IADC in 2002. The committee was formed by the national space
agencies of Italy, France, China, Germany, India, Japan, the
United States, Russia, Ukraine, and the ESA.19 IADC is not an
agency of the COPUOS, but the individual IADC countries are
active COPUOS members. The IADC submitted its guidelines to
COPUOS at which time they were modified by the COPUOS
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC);20 they were
later adopted by the full COPUOS and, in 2008, approved by
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 62/217,
which recommended adoption of the guidelines by the individ-
ual UN member states.21 The guidelines are not revolutionary.
They reflect state practice in 2007. They are now twelve years
old. When drafted, they were intended to be updated and re-
vised.22 That has not yet happened despite recognized need to
be strengthened.23
Two kinds of space debris are treated differently in the IADC
guidelines. One kind is short-term debris in low Earth orbit
(LEO), which must be deorbited within twenty-five years.24 An-
other kind is the long-term debris in geostationary Earth orbit
(GEO), which cannot be deorbited within twenty-five years but
must be sent out into a grave yard orbit before it becomes
defunct.25
17 Space Debris Mitigation, supra note 10.
18 See U.N. Office For Outer Space Affairs, Compendium of Space Debris Mitigation
Standards Adopted by States and International Organizations, http://www.unoosa
.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-debris/compendium.html [https://perma
.cc/H3E3-XLHX] [hereinafter Compendium of Space Debris Mitigation].
19 IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 15, at 3.
20 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/COPUOS-Guide-
linesE.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDG9-9M46] [hereinafter Space Debris Guidelines of
COPOUS].
21 G.A. Res. 62/217, ¶¶ 26–27 (Feb. 1, 2008).
22 Id. at ¶ 43.
23 See 7th European Conference on Space Debris, supra note 2.
24 IADC Space Debris Guidelines, supra note 15, at 9–10.
25 See id. at 9.
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The 2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines approved by the
UNGA are the following26:
(1) To limit the amount of debris released during normal
operations;
(2) To minimize the potential for break-ups and to cause
minimum space debris when break-up happens;
(3) To limit the probability of accidental break-up in outer
space;
(4) To avoid intentional destruction of space objects and
other harmful activities;
(5) To minimize the potential for post-mission break-up re-
sulting from stored energy by designing spacecraft so as
not to break up and spread debris pieces including fuel;
(6) To limit the long term presence of space craft and launch
vehicle orbital stages in the LEO region after the end of
their mission;
(7) To limit the long term interference of spacecraft and
launch vehicle in the geosynchronous Earth region at the
end of their mission.
Each of these guidelines covers a range of activities and capa-
bilities. The guidelines must be applied in accordance with ex-
isting space law.27 However, the guidelines themselves are not a
treaty obligation.28 They may be implemented in accordance
with their interpretation by each nation-state.29 Thus, imple-
mentation is not uniform.30 By comparison, one can look at avia-
tion standards and procedures under the ICAO and at the
maritime standards and procedures under the International
Maritime Organization (IMO).31 The ICAO and IMO standards
are drafted by experts within the two international organizations
and adopted by the organization; then they become mandatory
26 Id. at 8–9. For more discussion, see FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE
LAW: A TREATISE 276 (2d ed. 2018); see also STEPHEN HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COM-
MENTARY ON SPACE LAW, VOL. III 618–21 (2015).
27 Space Debris Guidelines of COPUOS, supra note 20.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See Compendium of Space Debris Mitigation, supra note 18 (listing standards
adopted by states and international organizations containing the space debris
regulations of twenty-four states and international organizations, except for Rus-
sia and China).
31 Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
arts. 15, 21, 28, Mar. 6, 1948, T.S. No 22, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 [hereinafter IMO
Convention].
2018] SOLVING THE SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS 481
for the member states, unless individual states file differences
needed by that state.32
Since 2007, the discussion in COPUOS has mainly concen-
trated on application and enforcement of the original guide-
lines. However, there have been several new developments since
2007. There is an increasing sense that the guidelines need to
be significantly strengthened. Contributing to greater pressure
for stricter international space debris regulation is the tenfold
increase in launches—caused by the launches of thousands of
small satellites in LEO—expected in the immediate future,33 the
planned tourism of people in outer space, the greater depen-
dence of some states like the United States on outer space activi-
ties, the developing military activities in outer space, the greater
freedom of commercial space activities, and the looming Kessler
Syndrome effects. Can IADC, as currently organized, meet the
space debris crisis? Or is this the time for a new international
body to examine the existing space debris situation, determine
the new need for space debris rules, draft new rules as necessary,
approve them, and submit them for eventual approval? To an-
swer those questions, this paper will examine the IADC agency
and its history, capabilities, and limits. This article will describe
and evaluate alternatives to the IADC to generate new and
stronger space debris rules.
II. TRACKING SPACE DEBRIS
When the location of space debris is known, it is possible for a
maneuverable satellite to avoid collisions. Furthermore, satellite
operators will avoid placing their satellites into orbits of known
debris. The large debris are most dangerous; thus, the ability to
32 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 38, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. See Paul B. Larsen,
Space Traffic Management Standards, 83 J. AIR. L. & COM. 359, 368–69, 370–71
(2018) [hereinafter Larsen, Space Traffic].
33 See Butt, supra note 4. The recent increase in start-up small satellite launch
operators seeking space insurance is causing space insurers to fear costly acci-
dents. See Debra Werner, Space Insurance Prices Could Rise if New Rocket and Small
Satellites Lead to Costly Accidents, SPACE NEWS para. 2 (Apr. 9, 2018), http://bt.e-di
tionsbyfry.com/publication/?i=488138&article_id=3056568&view=articleBrowser
&ver=html5#{%22issue_id%22:488138,%22view%22:%22articleBrowser%22,%
22article_id%22:%223056568%22} (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) (reporting on the
current volatility of the space insurance market). Added risk of accidents and
collisions result in the higher space insurance prices. Id. Availability of affordable
space insurance is an important incentive to do business in outer space. See id.
Increasing danger of collisions with space debris will undermine this incentive.
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track them is very important. Nevertheless, all the hundreds of
thousands of smaller debris are also threatening.
Tracking is an important tool for avoiding collisions in outer
space, but it does not solve the space debris problem. The U.S.
Air Force Space Surveillance Network (SSN) tracks 23,000 deb-
ris larger than ten centimeters in LEO and larger than thirty
centimeters in GEO.34 The new Air Force Space Fence system
will have ten times better tracking capability beginning in
2018.35 Only a small percentage of objects tracked are opera-
tional and navigable. Almost all the debris are unable to navi-
gate and thus not able to change course to avoid collision.
The most extensive tracking occurs through the SSN. How-
ever, the SSN is not intended for civilian tracking. Tracking mili-
tary space objects is essentially what the SSN was tasked to do by
the Air Force. It exists for national security. Fortunately, the SSN
has so far been willing to share its tracking information with ci-
vilian users. However, the SNN is now seeking to be relieved of
the civilian users’ dependence on it.36 Some satellites are very
small and may cause collisions because they are not trackable by
the SSN.37
III. EXISTING SPACE LAW38
Space debris is subject to existing international space law. Be-
cause space law was negotiated and established before debris
was recognized as a problem, it does not address debris directly,
and it can even be an obstacle to debris removal and liability.
Use of the state authorizing (licensing) process to regulate
generations of space debris is fundamental to resolution of the
space debris problem. Satellites operating in outer space are re-
quired to comply with existing international space law—regard-
34 See Mike Gruss, Good (Space) Fences Make for Good (Orbital) Neighbors, SPACE
NEWS para. 7 (Sept. 19, 2016), https://spacenews.com/good-space-fences-make-
for-good-orbital-neighbors/ [https://perma.cc/5H7K-LFJP].
35 Id. In higher orbits, the Air Force can track space debris as small as one
meter. See DAVID WRIGHT, THE CURRENT SPACE DEBRIS SITUATION 5 (2010), https:/
/swfound.org/media/99971/wright-space-debris_situation.pdf [https://perma
.cc/T7GQ-TJPD].
36 See also Jeff Foust, FAA Pins Price on Taking on Space-Traffic Job, SPACE NEWS
para. 2, 7–8 (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.spacenewsmag.com/feature/faa-pins-
price-on-taking-on-space-traffic-job/ [https://perma.cc/YZ83-G2XV].
37 See Butt, supra note 4.
38 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3; see Registration Convention, supra note
5; see Liability Convention, supra note 5; see Rescue and Return Agreement, supra
note 5; see Moon Agreement; see ITU Constitution, supra note 5.
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less of whether the satellites are operated by states or by non-
governmental entities.39 Only authorized satellites may be
launched and operated in outer space.40 States are responsible
for compliance with space treaties by their authorized satellite
operators. The governmental authorization process is the major
tool for states to ensure that their authorized operators are able
and willing to comply with existing space debris regulations,
whether imposed by treaty or by domestic regulations, such as
the IADC space guidelines if they are enforced by national regu-
lation. Launches should only be authorized if they are operated
in compliance with space debris regulations and guidelines. Un-
authorized operators cannot launch legally. Delinquent opera-
tors should be required by the authorizing country to deorbit.
A. WHAT IS DEBRIS?
Space law does not define space debris. The OST applies to
“space objects,” but it does not define space objects.41 The basic
question arises whether a piece of space debris is a “space ob-
ject” and thus governed by existing space law.42 Both the Liabil-
ity Convention and the Registration Convention provide that
the definition of space object includes their component parts as
well as the launching rocket and its component parts.43 Space
debris is therefore considered by space law experts to be space
objects.44
The owner of a defunct satellite may not wish to define a de-
funct satellite as space debris for several reasons, one of them
being that the owner wishes to retain the orbital slot and will
replace the defunct satellite with a working satellite. However,
Article II of the OST clearly states that outer space cannot be
39 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. VI.
40 See id.
41 Id. art. X.
42 See id. If space debris is a space object then it is included under the Outer
Space Treaty which applies to manmade space objects. If space debris is left out
of the definition of “space object,” could it then become subject to the Outer
Space Treaty Article II, which prohibits appropriation of celestial bodies? See id.
art. II.
43 See Registration Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(b); see also Liability Conven-
tion, supra note 5, art. 1(d).
44 See HOBE ET AL., supra note 26, at 445–46; see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26,
at 270–75; see also Ram S. Jakhu & Md Tanveer Ahmad, The Outer Space Treaty and
States’ Obligation to Remove Space Debris: A US Perspective, SPACE REV. para. 9 (Nov.
13, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3370/1 [https://perma.cc/
C2N6-UQCA].
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appropriated “by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.”45 Thus, there is no property right in an orbital slot.
The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines as adopted by
COPUOS define debris as follows: “[s]pace debris are all man
made objects including fragments and elements thereof, in
Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non func-
tional.”46 The IADC guidelines were not considered by the
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, which is the reason why the
guidelines have only this practical definition of space debris.47
However, since the guidelines were adopted in 2007, the defini-
tion has achieved some legal significance as accepted state
practice.48
B. HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WITH OTHER STATES’ ACTIVITIES
IN OUTER SPACE
In principle, states may not preclude access to outer space by
other states. Thus, continued deposits of space debris that may
preclude access to outer space would be contrary to Article I of
the OST.49 Specifically, states are prohibited from harmful inter-
ference with the space activities of other states under Article IX
of the OST.50 States must respect and pay “due regard” to the
interests of other states in outer space.51 Article 7 of the Moon
Agreement also prohibits harmful changes to the Earth’s envi-
ronment.52 These restrictions govern non-governmental opera-
tors operating in outer space under the legal umbrella of their
authorizing states.53
C. REMOVAL OF DEBRIS IN OUTER SPACE
The need for removal of debris from outer space motivates
much research activity on removal satellites that can repair, re-
new, and remove defunct satellites and debris.
45 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. II.
46 IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 15, at 5.
47 See HOBE ET AL., supra note 26, at 612–16.
48 Accepted state practice is proving the establishment of customary interna-
tional law. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Repub. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. ¶ 1, ¶ 71 (Feb. 28). The other requirement would be opinio juris, i.e.,
support of experts. Id.; see also Part III.I, infra.
49 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. I.
50 Id. art. IX.
51 Id.
52 See Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7, sec. 1.
53 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. VI, VIII.
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1. Removal of Debris by Its Launching State
A launching state may remove the debris caused by satellites
that it authorized in accordance with its own laws, pursuant to
Articles VI and VIII of the OST.54 Pursuant to Article VIII of the
OST, objects launched into outer space, including by non-gov-
ernmental entities, remain subject to the property laws of the
launching party.55 Furthermore, any component part of
launched space objects, including its space debris, remains the
property and responsibility of the original owner.56 Thus, early
in the space age, launching states like the United States would
register large debris pieces as space objects under the Registra-
tion Convention.57 However, the proliferation of space debris,
the identity of which was often uncertain, caused states to stop
registering debris.
The space debris identity problem is significant. When China
caused the demolition of its defunct satellite in LEO,58 it caused
a large cloud of space debris. Space debris interferes with the
safety of the space objects of other states, including the safety of
orbiting space stations in LEO as well as transit of launch vehi-
cles through LEO to deep space. Eventually this debris will de-
orbit and may harm the surface of the Earth.59
One possible remedy for the space debris problem would be
to require the owners of satellites and launch vehicles to post
bonds to insure against possible pollution. Such bonds would be
54 Id.
55 Id. The Outer Space Treaty Article VIII provides that “[o]wnership of ob-
jects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a
celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in
outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to Earth.” Id. art. VIII.
56 Id. Issues of jurisdiction, control, and ownership of space objects (including
their components such as space debris) are made subject to the law of the state of
their registration by the launching state. Id.
57 See, e.g., Letter from Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the Secretary General of the United Nations (Mar. 29, 1976), http://
www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/inf339E.pdf.
58 See 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Missile Test, WIKIPEDIA para. 1, https://en.wikipe
dia.org/wiki/2007_Chinese_anti-satellite_missile_test [https://perma.cc/3EVX-
JDV5].
59 See Leanna Garfield, China’s Out-of-Control Space Station May Release a Toxic
Chemical When It Crashes, BUS. INSIDER para. 3 (Mar. 30, 2018) http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/tiangong-1-chinese-space-station-crash-hydrazine-2018-3 [https:/
/perma.cc/685E-HLR9] (reporting on non-navigable defunct Chinese space sta-
tion deorbited in the Pacific Ocean on April 2, 2018). The IADC is examining
the reentry. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 107–14 (discussion of reentry);
see also Spotted in Space, SPACE IN IMAGES (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.esa.int/space
inimages/Images/2018/03/Spotted_in_space [https://perma.cc/45YQ-GSJS].
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available to compensate victims of collisions and for the removal
of debris caused by the collision.60 Consequently, a Global Fund
for Space Debris Removal, available for removal expenses, has
been proposed.61 A need exists for an insurance fund to com-
pensate for damages caused by space debris in outer space.62
2. Removal of Debris by Third Party States
Uncertainty about ownership of unidentifiable space debris
represents a difficulty in appropriation and removal of space
debris by states other than by the original launching state of reg-
istry.63 The problem is that some debris cannot be identified,
and thus, a claimant cannot prove that it belongs to an identifi-
able launching party. That may present uncertainty for a launch-
ing state about its legal right to valuable space debris. But, in
addition, it presents particular legal difficulty as to the right of
third party states to remove such debris. The uncertainty of
property rights to debris causes third party states to hesitate to
remove unregistered and unclaimed space debris. A general in-
ternational agreement to waive sovereign claims to unidentified
space debris to facilitate removal of debris by third parties is
recommended.64
Related to the removal issue is the 1992 UN Conference on
Environment and Development, which adopted the principle
that where there is danger of irreversible damages to the envi-
ronment the threatened states may exercise preventive mea-
sures. This principle is also expressed in Article 17(2) of the
European Community Treaty. The EU Treaty requires that the
preventive measures must be proportional to the danger.65
60 See Polluter Pays, SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT, http://www.sustainable-environ-
ment.org.uk/Principles/Polluter_Pays.php [https://perma.cc/4CL8-HSKZ].
61 Alshamsi et al., supra note 8, at 61–64 (describing the McGill Declaration on
Active Space Debris and On-Orbit Satellite Servicing).
62 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 270–75; see also Mark J. Sundahl, Note,
Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125 (2000).
63 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 270–75.
64 See Alshamsi et al., supra note 8, at 58–60. The authors suggest that such a
waiver could be accomplished through the consultations required under Article
IX Outer Space Treaty in order to resolve possibilities of harmful interferences
with other states. Id.
65 See European Commission Press Release IP/00/96, Commission Adopts
Communication on Precautionary Principle (Feb. 2, 2000); see also Paul B. Lar-
sen, International Regulation of Near Earth Objects (NEOs), 67 ZLW 104, 116 (2018)
[hereinafter Larsen, International Regulation].
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D. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES IN OUTER SPACE AND ON EARTH
States are internationally liable for damages caused by their
satellite operators, including non-governmental entities,
whether in outer space or on the surface of the Earth pursuant
to the OST.66 Launching states are liable not only for damages
caused by space objects and their component parts, including
space debris, but also for debris of the launch vehicle and its
parts. Subsequent to the OST, most states have adopted the Lia-
bility Convention, which establishes absolute state liability for all
damages caused by space objects and space debris of their state
and non-governmental entities on the surface of and in the at-
mosphere of the Earth.67 Liability for damage by their space
debris in outer space is subject to proof of fault.68 Thus, space
objects entering Earth’s atmosphere and causing damage are
subject to absolute liability for damages caused. However, most
damages are caused in outer space, which is governed by a liabil-
ity regime based on proof of fault by the operator.69 Much space
debris will be difficult to trace to any state and it may thus be
impossible to hold states liable under the Liability Convention.
Absolute state liability for damages caused by space debris would
be a significant deterrent. States would thus be cautioned not to
authorize outer space activities that may result in space debris
and, consequently, state liability.
Space objects may be launched by international organiza-
tions, in which case the international organization is primarily
liable, and the individual member states are secondarily respon-
sible for liability.70
E. REGISTRATION
The Registration Convention requires registration of all space
objects, including their components.71 The purpose of this Con-
vention is to indicate space objects’ location in orbit so that they
can be avoided and to identify responsible states.72 Thus, the
Convention appears to be intended for registration of known
dangerous space debris. Indeed, the reference to components
66 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. VII.
67 Liability Convention, supra note 5, art. II.
68 Id. art. III.
69 Id.
70 Id. art. XXII.
71 Registration Convention, supra note 5, art. I(b), II (defining space objects to
include their component parts as well as the “launch vehicle and parts thereof”).
72 Id. at Introduction.
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appears to require states to register space debris. States such as
the United States registered large space debris during the early
period of the space age.73 However, the registration of small
pieces of debris presents a practical problem, because most deb-
ris is of miniscule size and nearly impossible to register. Even
the launching state may not know and recognize all the debris
caused by launches or collisions. UNGA Resolution 62/10174
made recommendations for states to adopt uniform practices in
registering space objects. The resolution recommends that the
physical condition of space objects, changes in orbit, rate of de-
cay, and possible reentry of objects should be reported to the
UN registry.75
It is apparent that any ambiguity as to whether identifiable
debris should be considered a space object as opposed to being
treated separately should be resolved in favor of registering
identifiable debris in orbit. One interesting idea is to consider
registration as indication of ownership76 and to treat all unregis-
tered debris as free of ownership claims and thus freely remova-
ble by third parties.77
F. DUTY TO WARN OF IMPENDING DANGER OF COLLISIONS
WITH SPACE DEBRIS.
Related to the discussion of registration is the duty of states to
inform other states and the UN Secretary General about ob-
served dangers to astronauts.78 States that believe their outer
space activities may harm other states must first engage in con-
sultations with other states in order to alert them of threatening
dangers.79 The duty to warn is also expressed in the UNGA Re-
mote Sensing Resolution 41/65 of 1985.80
73 See, e.g., Letter from Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the Secretary General of the United Nations (Mar. 29, 1976), http://
www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/inf339E.pdf.
74 G.A. Res. 62/101, ¶ 2 (Dec. 17, 2007).
75 Id.
76 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. VIII (linking ownership to
registration).
77 See Alhamsi et. al., supra note 8, at 62. Alhamsi, Balleste, and Hanlon suggest
that registration should determine ownership. Id. Thus, unregistered debris
could be freely removed by third parties. Id.
78 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. V. The UN Secretary General in
turn should notify the States.
79 Id. arts. IX, XI; see also Moon Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5, 6, 7.
80 See G.A. Res. 41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986).
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G. RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS IN OUTER SPACE
Space debris from nuclear explosions in outer space is specifi-
cally prohibited by the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
1963.81 However, states are permitted to use nuclear power
sources (NPS) to generate electric energy for the operation of
satellites. NPS debris is of particular interest because of its dan-
gerous nature. NPS debris became an actual problem with the
disintegration of the Russian satellite COSMOS 954 over North-
ern Canada, which spread nuclear debris over a large area of the
Canadian tundra in 1978.82 Russia (then the USSR) acknowl-
edged its responsibility by agreeing to compensate Canada for
the damages caused.83
NPS debris, in addition to being regulated by existing regula-
tions on space debris, is also subject to the 1992 UN Principles
Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space.84
The UN Principles seek to minimize the use and danger of radi-
oactive space debris. Only U235-enriched uranium may be used
to generate electricity.85 NPS reactors may be used if sent into
high graveyard orbits at the end of their use.86 Reactors may not
be made critical until they reach operating orbit or in interplan-
etary travel.87 Radioisotope generators (RTG) must also be
stored in high graveyard orbit at the end of use.88 NPS energy
sources must be safely enclosed so that they will not fracture and
cause contamination if they reenter the Earth’s atmosphere and
land on the surface of the Earth.89
H. RETURN OF DEBRIS
Article VIII of the OST provides that space objects, including
their components, found outside their state of registration must
be returned to the state of registry upon proof of ownership.90
Thus space debris, being included within the definition of the
81 See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water art. I, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
82 Canada: Claim against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage
Caused by Cosmos 954, 18 I.L.M 899 (1979).
83 Id.
84 See G.A. Res 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992).
85 Id. at Principle 3(2)(c).
86 Id. at Principle 3(2)(a)(iii).
87 Id. at Principle 3(2)(d).
88 Id. at Principle 3(3)(a).
89 Id. at Principle 3(3)(b).
90 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. VIII; see also Search and Rescue
Convention, supra note 5, arts. 4, 5.
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“component parts” of space objects, must be returned.91 It is im-
possible to prove ownership of most space debris. That would
relieve states of their duty to return. There is uncertainty about
the legal right to dispose of found debris. However, much debris
is of no value, so the states of registry may not wish to claim
ownership.
Article 5 of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space92 specifically requires states to notify launching au-
thorities of recovery of their debris and to place it at the disposal
of the launching authority. However, the Agreement provides
that cost of recovery and return shall be paid by the launching
authority.93
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A question remains whether a state must remove space debris
that originates from objects it authorized to be placed in outer
space. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Law of Jus-
tice states that the International Court of Justice shall apply cus-
tomary international law in deciding disputes brought before
the court.94 Customary international law is evidenced by “gen-
eral practice accepted as law” by the states.95 For guidance the
court looks at precedents set by prior international law deci-
sions. A court of arbitration in the Trail Smelter Case96 issued a
seminal decision on pollution. It held that a state (Canada) was
liable for pollution damage caused to another state (the United
States).97 Several other international court cases concluded like-
wise.98 Thus, it is customary international law that states can be
held responsible for pollution damage caused to other states.
Space debris may be viewed as pollution of outer space. That
may trigger the customary international law principle that the
91 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. VIII.
92 See Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.
93 Id.
94 See The Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 1977 U.N.Y.B.
31, U.N. Sales No. E.79.1.1; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 1158 U.N.T.S. 331; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 63–73.
95 See The Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 1977 U.N.Y.B.
31, U.N. Sales No. E.79.1.1.
96 Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 33 AM. J. INT’L. L. 182, 182 (1939).
97 Id. at 182.
98 See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1948 I.C.J. Rep. 1 (Dec.
17); see also Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
13 (Sept. 13).
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polluter must pay for pollution damage caused by the polluter.
The principle may apply not only to prevent the polluter from
engaging in pollution of outer space but also to cause the pol-
luter to compensate for the damage.99 The principle that the
polluter pays for pollution it caused is adopted in Article 191(2)
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union and it
is increasingly adopted into national legislation, including U.S.
environmental laws.100
Also, relevant as customary international law is the Precau-
tionary Principle, which requires launching states to exercise ex-
traordinary caution in deciding whether to launch objects into
outer space when there is a significant element of uncertainty
about the outcome.101 Thus, if a launch includes the danger of
space debris causing irreversible damage, then the Precaution-
ary Principle would require a launching state as well as a non-
governmental operator to take extra precaution in launching a
space object that may result in space debris. Such a precaution
would, at a minimum, require a state and an operator to observe
the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, which are founded on
normal operating procedures. The liability that a state and an
operator incur for violating the Precautionary Principle will be
an incentive to avoid and minimize causing space debris. Being
a legal principle that is protective of the Earth’s environment, it
can be read into Article IX of the OST, the purpose of which is
also to protect the Earth’s environment.102
J. STATE OF CONVENIENCE PROBLEM
Many small states do not have the resources to fully carry out
their responsibilities under existing space law, but they may still
encourage operators of space objects to register and be author-
ized in their states. These are so-called “flag of convenience”
99 See Principles of EU Environmental Law: The Polluter Pays Principle, EURO.
COMM’N 1, 6 (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/pdf/princi-
ples/2%20Polluter%20Pays%20Principle_revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC2M-
X3YK] [hereinafter Principles of EU Environmental Law]; see also Polluter Pays Princi-
ple, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polluter_pays_principle [https://
perma.cc/Q5FC-8E8G].
100 See Principles of EU Environmental Law, supra note 99, at 14.
101 Paul B. Larsen, Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR
L. & COM. 295, 296 (2006).
102 See Larsen, International Regulation, supra note 65, at 117.
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states, a familiar phenomenon of maritime law.103 At issue are
states’ responsibilities and liabilities under the OST, the Liability
Convention, the Registration Convention, the ITU Constitution,
and the ITU Convention (including its radio regulations).104
Some small states encourage commercial operators to operate
out of their states by “offering incentives and accommodating
regulatory frameworks as the proliferation of new technologies
and companies continues apace.”105 Thus, the flag of conve-
nience states present a possible weakness in the legal framework
for regulation of space debris and for minimizing its effects. Flag
of convenience is a developing trend in current space com-
merce and needs to be considered.106
IV. URGENCY OF THE SPACE DEBRIS PROBLEM
A. NEW DEBRIS RESTRICTIONS ARE NEEDED
The IADC guidelines are not universally adopted and, where
adopted, they are implemented differently by the nation-states.
The ESA Overview of Space Debris107 reports that the IADC
guidelines, being voluntary, lack enforcement. LEO is the most
critical space environment that needs to be more strictly regu-
lated. “Only 25% of the rocket upper stages and 10% of the
satellites in LEO perform an active manoeuvre in order to com-
ply with the IADC recommendations.”108
A drastic increase in new launches is expected in the near fu-
ture. In 2017, there were 3,200 intact objects in LEO.109 One
expert estimates launches of 6,200 small satellites are actually
scheduled for the 2017–2026 time period.110 Another recent
103 FRANS G. VON DER DUNK, TOWARDS “FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE” IN SPACE? 2
(2012), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/lsc2012/symp-05E.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/9A7Q-HDKR].
104 See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26; see also Alshamsi et al., supra
note 8, at 55.
105 See Butt, supra note 4. This author points to Luxemburg and United Arab
Emirates as examples. Id. Neither country has a member agency in the IADC. See
INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE, https://www.iadc-online
.org/ [https://perma.cc/5KG2-WC83].
106 See Butt, supra note 4 (noting the problems posed by the use of flags of
convenience in space with respect to debris).
107 See Space Operations Space Debris: The ESA Approach, supra note 2.
108 Id.
109 Active Debris Removal, EURO. SPACE AGENCY (Apr. 14, 2017), https://
m.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/Active_debris_removal
[https://perma.cc/V6Z6-NM2L].
110 See Jaroslaw Adamowski, Smallsat Market Forecast to Exceed $30 Billion in Com-
ing Decade, SPACE NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://spacenews.com/smallsat-market-
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source reports that at least 8,000 satellites are currently planned
to be orbited by LEO and MEO broad band constellations from
a number of countries, including the United States, China, Ca-
nada, South Korea, Russia, India, and England111 (the space
agencies of these countries are members of the IADC).
Such a large, unprecedented proliferation of new launches
presents a new situation, causing IADC to review whether the
current IADC guidelines are adequate. This increase in
launches raises the issue of whether the twenty-five year deorbit
rule should be strengthened by requiring quicker deorbits. The
2017 IADC report states: “It is clear that significant improve-
ments in the reliability of the disposal function at end of life will
be needed for the new constellations compared with that cur-
rently demonstrated by space systems on orbit.”112 IADC favors
stricter rules and enforcement thereof.
Several studies and models of the growing danger have been
made. The NASA orbital debris evolutionary model (LEGEND),
developed in 2012, focused on accumulation in LEO of debris
greater than ten centimeters113 because it is most likely to dam-
age functioning satellites and because it is so large that it can be
tracked and studied. The study showed “that even with no future
explosion and global 95-percent compliance with the 25-year
rule, the LEO debris population is expected to increase slowly
during the next 200 years.”114 Modeling shows that there would
be an average of twenty-six catastrophic and nineteen non-cata-
strophic collisions in the next 200 years under this model.115 In
view of expected quadrupling of the number of new launches
with regular replacements of defunct satellites, these numbers
may be expected to be significantly higher. J.-C. Liou, one of the
NASA space debris experts, states that even if space launches
forecast-to-exceed-30-billion-in-coming-decade/ [https://perma.cc/GG5L-DKQ
X].
111 See Caleb Henry, LEO and MEO Broadband Constellations Mega Source of Con-
sternation, SPACE NEWS (Mar. 13, 2018); see also Butt, supra note 4 (predicting a
ten-fold increase in small satellites in orbit).
112 See Holger Krag, An Overview of the IADC Annual Activities, IADC 1, 17 (Feb.
1, 2017), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2017/tech-16E
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WXE-LTKN].
113 See J.-C. Liou, Effectiveness of Satellite Postmission Disposal to Limit Orbital Debris
Population Growth in Low Earth Orbit, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE AGENCY 1, 72
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150003819.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/2FE8-9A36].
114 Id. at 73.
115 Id. at 72.
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were to cease that would not stop the increase of debris in
space.116 New procedures will have to be established.117
Examples of international regulation of new debris could
involve:
(1) Mandatory international standards imposed on states by
UN-affiliated Organizations;118




(2) Legal obligation on the operator and the authorizing
country to remove debris caused by new launches;
(3) Removal of new debris by non-owners;
(4) Registration of space debris;
(5) Lower than twenty-five years deorbits in LEO;
(6) More efficient transfer of satellites in GEO into grave-
yard orbits at the end of their useful existence;
(7) Greater restrictions on the number of launches;
(8) Greater restrictions on launches into certain orbits;
(9) Duty to catalogue and register as much debris as
possible;
(10) Design of satellites and launch vehicles so they cannot
break up;
(11) Passive protection techniques (presently used to protect
the ISS).
B. OLD DEBRIS REMOVAL
The total amount of space debris will continue to grow even
with 100% implementation of the IADC guidelines. Providing
for the removal of old debris may be a most difficult task. Never-
theless, the 2017 ESA Space Debris Conference concluded that
space debris removal is necessary for resolution of the space
debris problem.119 Several removal schemes are being investi-
gated.120 ESA has reportedly dedicated $445 million to the in-
116 Id. at 73.
117 Id.
118 See generally Larsen, Space Traffic, supra note 32 (describing several models
for international standards in space traffic management).
119 See Solutions to Space Debris Problems Addressed at European Conference, supra
note 2.
120 See Space Debris, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris
[https://perma.cc/7ET4-R2NS].
2018] SOLVING THE SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS 495
vention and construction of removal satellites.121 However, no
widely successful approach has yet been found.
Examples of better international regulation of old debris
could involve:
(1) General authority to remove old debris regardless of pre-
vious ownership;122
(a) Removal of large objects
(b) Removal of debris most likely to collide because of
orbiting in orbits densely populated by functioning
satellites
(c) Removal of debris likely to remain the longest in
outer space
(2) Registration of large debris;
(3) More effective transfer of old satellites in GEO into grave-
yard orbits;
(4) Resolution of ownership of debris issue;
(5) Regulation of graveyard orbits;
(6) Obligation to catalogue and register all known past debris
caused;
(7) Absolute liability for debris in outer space as provided in
the Outer Space Treaty Article VII.
C. CONCLUSION
Because of the increasing growth of debris, the collision dan-
gers are escalating. Thus, the sooner new and improved regula-
tion of outer space debris is established and implemented, the
more effective the new regulations will be. ESA studies show that
delay of remedial action until 2050 would be less effective than
remedial regulation taking effect now.123 The ESA report ex-
presses the view that change of international law on ownership
of space objects and of liability for space objects are most ur-
gently needed.124
Outer space does not belong to any state. It is non-sovereign.
Therefore, regulation requires international agreement to regu-
late all nations. States must agree not only to adopt necessary
regulations, but also to enforce those regulations. The drasti-
121 See Alshamsi et al., supra note 8, at 60.
122 See, e.g., Space Operations Space Debris: The ESA Approach, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing potential mitigation initiatives by the ESA).
123 Space Operations Space Debris: The ESA Approach, supra note 2, at 6.
124 See id. at 11 (“Legal constraints associated with the ownership of space deb-
ris and related liability issues cannot be neglected . . . .”).
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cally increased outer space activities and the seemingly unstop-
pable increase in space debris will require new international
laws and regulations. Otherwise, long term outer space use will
not be sustainable.125
V. INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR THE
SPACE DEBRIS PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF SPACE DEBRIS RESTRICTIONS
COPUOS126 is the major forum for discussion, coordination,
and resolution of international regulation of space debris
problems. The major treaties, such as the OST, are negotiated
first in COPUOS. The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
were drafted in IADC, proposed and adopted in COPUOS, and
submitted to the UNGA for approval in UNGA Resolution 62/
217 in 2007. All the space-interested states participate in
COPUOS negotiations reflecting their individual and common
interests. Initiatives adopted by COPUOS, such as the voluntary
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, achieve their effectiveness
through mandatory regulation and enforcement by the individ-
ual states because the guidelines have no legal compulsion in
and of themselves. The guidelines are the only recognized regu-
latory restriction on space debris generation. Their preparation
by the IADC and submission to COPUOS were absolutely essen-
tial for their adoption. This IADC initiative was very important
and valued by all countries. The problem is that the guidelines
are not a sufficient restriction on space debris generation.
B. THE IADC SPACE DEBRIS REGULATORY OPTION
Early concerns with the proliferation of space debris led
NASA and ESA to consider the need for space debris mitiga-
tion.127 The United States, being most heavily invested in outer
space affairs, has the most to lose from space debris collisions
with space objects. The United States invests heavily in tracking
large debris in order to avoid collisions, but tracking is not the
125 See Butt, supra note 4.
126 See G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959); see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26,
at 15.
127 See Nicholas Johnson, Origin of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Com-
mittee, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE AGENCY 70, 70, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/
archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150003818.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3JG-
7BCQ].
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solution to the problems.128 To counter the ultimate problem of
debris’ foreclosure of access to outer space, NASA initiated con-
versation with other major space powers to limit debris genera-
tion.129 Beginning in 1987, NASA and ESA discussed ways to
limit and mitigate new generation of space debris.130 Because
the debris problem is international in scope, other major space
agencies became involved in these efforts. There are now thir-
teen IADC members.131 Notably, the IADC is not a member of
COPUOS.132 However, it briefs COPUOS on its activities, and
individual country delegations can and do introduce IADC ideas
unto COPUOS.133 In these ways, IADC is able to influence
COPUOS decision-making and has, by default, become the ma-
jor source of technical knowledge about space debris and its reg-
ulation. As a result, the IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines were adopted by COPUOS with minor modifications
in 2007. Other IADC activities include discussing exchanges of
information among members about deorbiting space objects,
untracked debris objects in orbit, and ways to protect space ob-
jects from space debris.134 IADC has formed the following work-
ing groups: (1) Measurements; (2) Environment and Data-
bases; (3) Protection of Satellites in Orbit; and (4) Debris Miti-
gation.135 IADC members use these working groups to exchange
information about space debris research, cooperate on space
debris research, review progress made on cooperative activities,
and identify alternative ways to mitigate debris.136
IADC considers itself to be the world’s technical and scientific
authority on space debris. It aims to continue to develop space
debris mitigation strategies and to influence COPUOS space
debris mitigation activities.137
128 See supra Section IV.
129 See supra Section IV.
130 See Johnson, supra note 127, at 70.
131 See INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE, supra note 105.
132 See Johnson, supra note 127, at 71.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE, supra note 105.
136 See Krag, supra note 112, at 4.
137 Id. at 18; see also INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE,
https://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub [https://perma.cc/
WFU4-B7FJ] (list of documents published by the IADC showing the continuing
work by the IADC).
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1. IADC Strengths
IADC is a unique organization, having been able to galvanize
the major national space agencies into recognition that the deb-
ris in outer space is rapidly accumulating and of the dangers
thereto.138 Furthermore, these thirteen state agencies have the
resolve to act jointly when member states of COPUOS prove ei-
ther unable or too slow to agree on remedies for the space deb-
ris problem in COPUOS. Key to the success of the IADC
initiative has been IADC’s ability to characterize the guidelines
as technical, thus distancing the debris issue from the realm of
national security politics. The success of the technical IADC
guidelines may be contrasted with the failure of the European
Union to persuade the world to adopt a code of conduct for
reasonable traffic rules in outer space. The EU’s valiant effort to
establish a code of behavior for outer space activities failed be-
cause the draft Code of Conduct touched on national security
issues, which is difficult in today’s political world. By contrast,
IADC avoids politics by addressing the dangers of space debris
from a non-political stance. Characterizing space debris as being
a technical problem establishes an important precedent for
other outer space regulation because many aspects or functions
in outer space can be characterized and treated as technical.139
The general acceptance of the IADC guidelines by the wider
geographical distribution of COPUOS member states is indeed
remarkable.140 Considering the slow process of decision-making
in COPUOS, it was unusual that the guidelines, authored by an
outside committee, were so quickly accepted. Their acceptance
illustrates the urgency of the space debris issue.141 It helped pro-
gress on the guidelines in that the states began to make them
mandatory standards even before they were approved by the
UNGA Resolution 62/217.142 The IADC must be praised for its
138 See STUFF IN SPACE, supra note 1 (database tracking objects in Earth’s orbit).
139 Aviation and maritime transportation as well as satellite telecommunication
are characterized as technical by the Chicago Convention, IMO, and ITU trea-
ties. See Chicago Convention, supra note 32; IMO Convention, supra note 31; ITU
Constitution, supra note 5. Several other outer space issues may also be character-
ized as similarly technical in nature. For example, standards and procedures for
regulation of traffic in outer space may be characterized as technical. See Larsen,
Space Traffic, supra note 32, 23–24. Regulation of collision with asteroids may also
be characterized as technical. See Larsen, International Regulation, supra note 65, at
104.
140 See HOBE ET AL., supra note 26, at 624–25.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 614–15.
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leadership and organization where and when COPUOS was una-
ble to perform. Consequently, the world now benefits from ac-
tion on the space debris problem, although the remedy is
insufficient to resolve the problem. Much more needs to be
done. Despite its limited mandate to resolve one of the world’s
problems, the IADC continues to exercise its initiative, because
no other international organization has stepped up to the task.
Great credit goes to the individuals who took this initiative as
well as to the agencies that facilitated and joined.
2. IADC Weaknesses
The focus of the following discussion is on IADC’s legal short-
comings, including its lack of UN status, the inadequate geo-
graphical distribution of its membership, its inability to enforce
international space debris regulations, its inability to adopt
mandatory international regulations, its inability to constantly
supervise and update space debris regulations, and its inability
to adopt international regulations on responsibility for removal
of old space debris.
a. IADC Lack of Official UN Status and Geographic
Representation
The IADC is without official UN status. The universality of the
space debris problem illustrates the difficulty of a small group of
thirteen national space agencies establishing space debris guide-
lines for the large majority of countries. It raises the issue of the
need for greater universality of decision-making regarding con-
trol of space debris. Decision-making gets skewed when a group
of specialized state agencies, with no official status in the United
Nations, formulates rules of behavior for adoption by all the
countries in the world instead of national governments. There is
a need for universal, international decision-making by all states
rather than just a few. It raises the issue of whether an interna-
tional treaty on space debris would be a better solution.143
b. Problems of Enforcement
ESA and NASA surveys144 show lack of enforcement of the
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. They can also be inter-
preted to show that 100% compliance is necessary. As of 2015,
IADC reports a large number of fragments in LEO; only 40% of
143 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 274.
144 See supra Section IV.
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space objects in GEO orbits are properly re-orbited, and only
65% of space objects in LEO comply with the twenty-five year
deorbit rule, which means that significant new debris still con-
tinues to be left in outer space.145 Thus, the 2017 ESA Space
Debris Conference concluded that the IADC guidelines need to
be strengthened considerably.146 However, IADC does not have
legal authority to enforce its guidelines. Only the states can do
so. The lack of state enforcement indicates that stronger and
broader state commitment to the guidelines are needed for res-
olution of the space debris problem.
c. Constant Need for Updating Guidelines
Increasing evidence shows that much stricter regulation is
needed and that the guidelines should be updated.147 The
twenty-five year deorbit rule for space objects placed in LEO
should be tightened; states should be required to deorbit small
satellites more quickly. This is particularly important because of
the avalanche of small satellites planned to be orbited in the
near future. The IADC guidelines were last approved by
COPUOS in 2007. However, neither the IADC nor COPUOS
have managed, in the eleven subsequent years, to update the
guidelines. Furthermore, IADC experts agree that removal of old
debris is necessary, but the IADC has not been able to agree on
guidelines on old debris removal. Nor has the IADC been able
to persuade COPUOS to agree on debris removal guidelines. It is
apparent that an international permanent space debris commis-
sion, somewhat like the ICAO Air Navigation Commission, is
needed to continuously analyze the space debris developments
and use its expertise to write and adopt new guidelines. A
stronger international decision-making framework is needed.148
The IADC has no prospect of being able to produce
mandatory space debris standards because is not an organiza-
tion of member countries. It only represents space agencies partici-
pating in the IADC. The IADC representatives do not even have
authority to adopt mandatory regulations applicable to
branches of government in their own countries. NASA does not
issue licenses to U.S. non-government operators.149 Nor does it
145 See Krag, supra note 112, at 13.
146 Solutions to Space Debris Problems Addressed at European Conference, supra note 2.
147 See supra Section IV.
148 See supra Section IV.
149 See Paul B. Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, 82. J. AIR. L. & COM. 275,
281–82 (2017). NASA authorizes only its own governmental launches. The Fed-
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have the authority to order U.S. non-governmental operators to
obey the guidelines. In the United States, each federal agency is
free to adopt and enforce their own space debris guidelines.
Thus, there are many opportunities for different interpretations
of the guidelines. A standing international body with decision-
making authority for uniform interpretations of the guidelines
is needed.
3. Evaluation: IADC is Admirable, but is Not the Ultimate Solution
to the Space Debris Problem
The IADC cannot resolve the overall problem presented by
the Kessler Syndrome of steadily increasing accumulation of
space debris and thus escalating dangers of collisions in outer
space.150 The IADC succeeded in gaining COPUOS’ adoption of
its proposed space debris mitigation guidelines for future outer
space launches. Those guidelines need to be further strength-
ened; they need to be mandatory and be enforced strictly. Fur-
thermore, new regulations are needed for the escalating
amount of old debris which keeps multiplying as it collides and
fragments further. Thus, it is necessary to consider whether
other options may function better than the IADC approach to
space debris regulation.
C. OPTION OF A STRENGTHENED COPUOS COMMITTEE
ON DEBRIS REGULATION
COPUOS is a committee of the UNGA responsible for special-
ized outer space issues. It is not a decision-making body. Its pur-
pose is to study and to recommend to the UNGA the adoption
of measures to promote peace and security in the world. Thus, it
is the obvious forum for discussion of space issues. It has been
the forum for the drafting of the five major treaties on the law of
outer space, of which the OST has become something in the
nature of a “constitution” for outer space. While COPUOS has
been instrumental in drafting rules for outer space, the final de-
cision-maker on these legal instruments are the separate diplo-
matic conferences of states. COPUOS accepted the IADC
eral Communications Commission (FCC) licenses radiofrequencies and related
orbital slots for commercial space activities, the FAA licenses commercial
launches, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration adminis-
ters remote sensing satellite. Id. Oversight over activities in outer space has not
been delegated by implementing U.S. legislation. Id. at 282. Administration of
space treaty responsibilities remains the task of the Department of State. Id.
150 See discussion supra Section V.B.2.
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recommendation for guidelines, approved them with minor
modifications, and submitted the guidelines to the UNGA for
final approval, after which it became the task of individual states
to adopt and implement the guidelines.
1. Strengths
COPUOS is the generally accepted forum for states to meet to
discuss and coordinate all space issues. By contrast there is no
specialized international sub-agency for outer space. ICAO is the
UN sub-agency for aviation. IMO is a UN sub-agency for mari-
time issues, and ITU is a UN sub-agency for telecommunication.
COPUOS is serviced by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs
(UNOOSA). Besides servicing COPUOS, UNOOSA administers
the registration of space objects pursuant to the Registration
Convention. It maintains UN-SPRINGER to service the UN Dis-
aster Charter, and it services the special International Advisory
Committee for Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), which
provides a special forum for international coordination and co-
operation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).151 The
UN could establish a similar international advisory committee
for space debris which could serve as a forum for states to coor-
dinate all issues relating to space debris. Such a committee
could draft and update space debris guidelines for approval by
the COPUOS for submission to the UNGA for approval and dis-
tribution to the states.
2. Weaknesses
Work in COPUOS proceeds very slowly mainly because it op-
erates by consensus decision-making. Another difficulty is that
COPUOS discussions include national security considerations.
Space debris issues are technical issues. Space debris can have
military consequences but is basically a civil issue. The military
space issues are now focused in the UN Conference of Disarma-
ment in Geneva.152
As shown in its formulation of and approval of the Space Deb-
ris Mitigation Guidelines, COPUOS usually works very slowly. By
contrast, the Kessler Syndrome makes the space debris issue ur-
151 See Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Sys-
tems, 80 J. AIR. L. & COM. 365, 365 (2015).
152 See discussion in Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control: Can the USA, Rus-
sia and China Make this Happen, J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 1, 1–23 (2016) [herein-
after Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control].
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gent and not suitable to the slow proceedings of COPUOS.
Space debris will foreclose access to outer space and debris will
collide with functioning satellites if the problem is not resolved
quickly. COPUOS was able to process the IADC guidelines be-
cause they were basically negotiated by IADC, an outside, non-
UN organization. The prospects are slim that COPUOS can
speedily produce international standards for removal of old deb-
ris and produce strengthened standards for new debris produc-
tion. Production of new guidelines might require new legal
authority, in particular if the guidelines were to become more
like mandatory international standards in the nature of the
ICAO international air navigation standards.
3. Evaluation: COPUOS Is Too Slow, Unwieldy, and Not Suited for
Decision-Making and Administration of International
Regulations that Will Resolve the Space Debris Problem
The difficulty of leaving the basic space debris problem with
COPUOS is best illustrated by COPUOS’s present reliance on
the IADC to spearhead COPUOS activity on space debris.
COPUOS is charged with responsibility for a large number of
outer space issues. COPUOS meets only once a year and is not
able to assume responsibility for resolving all the problems of
the urgent Kessler Syndrome. It cannot produce mandatory
space debris regulations, cannot supervise enforcement, and
cannot administer space debris regulations.
D. OPTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SPACE DEBRIS ORGANIZATION
1. ICAO Analogy Option
An international space debris organization capable of estab-
lishing international mandatory standards for old as well as for
new space debris would require new decision-making authority.
One model for such an organization could be the ICAO, which
is a sub-agency of the United Nations. ICAO’s main purpose is
to establish international standards and procedures for air traf-
fic that are mandatory and uniform.153 The authorizing treaty is
the 1944 Chicago Convention.154 Its Article 37 establishes
153 Chicago Convention, supra note 32.
154 Id. ICAO declined to participate in the regulation of outer space at the
beginning of the space age, thus leaving outer space issues for the United Na-
tions and the states. See Paul B. Larsen, Space Activities and Their Effect on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation, 9 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 159, 163 (1966).
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ICAO’s standard-setting functions for civil aviation.155 Article 56
provides for the creation of the ICAO Air Navigation Commis-
sion, which is a standing commission of nineteen experts.156 Its
function is to draft standards and to continuously update ex-
isting standards as needed by new developments.157 The techni-
cal experts do not represent states and are therefore not
beholden to specific states. The Commission has subcommittees
on specific subjects. In their examinations, the experts solicit
contributions from private operators, users, and air services, as
well as from states. The standards are agreed to by the Air Navi-
gation Commission and submitted to the ICAO Council for ap-
proval, after which the standards are submitted to the ICAO
member states. At that point in time the individual states have
the option of filing deviations from the international stan-
dards.158 The standards apply only to civil users.159 Military oper-
ators tend to observe the civil standards for the sake of
uniformity and safety.
a. Strengths
Focusing decision-making on international standards and pro-
cedures for all kinds of space debris would remove the decision-
making from all the other many issues that are now discussed in
COPUOS. If the ICAO model were adopted, then an expert
technical commission would be charged with examination of
the technical and physical ways of best limiting and removing
debris. The commission would not be distracted by political is-
sues as COPUOS is now. The decision-making would take place
in a UN forum. It would not be dependent on an outside group
like the IADC. The standards and procedures developed by a
space debris commission would become mandatory upon ap-
proval by a small space debris council and only subject to devia-
tions by individual states for good cause. States would appreciate
the safety and navigation advantages of uniform international
space debris rules. Decision-making would be expedited because
the space debris commission would only be motivated by the ur-
gency of the need for space debris regulation. As in ICAO, the
space debris standards and procedures would establish the mini-
mum requirements with states free to create more comprehen-
155 Chicago Convention, supra note 32, art. 37.
156 Id. art. 56.
157 Id.
158 Id. art. 38.
159 Id. art. 3.
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sive rules. The individual states would implement and enforce
the space debris standards and procedures, subject to oversight
by a new international space debris organization. It would be a
small UN sub-agency with universal participation and decision-
making powers, similar to ICAO. The ICAO model has certainly
worked for commercial aviation. Applied to space traffic, the
aim would be an ICAO-like transparency, certainty, and
reliability.
b. Weaknesses
The weakness of adopting the ICAO model would be that it is
very difficult for states to adopt a new framework. However, ma-
jor devastating collisions, like a destructive collision with the In-
ternational Space Station or cascades of collisions caused by
cascades of debris would convince the world of the need for
drastic action.160 Such collisions in outer space will happen. The
wise choice would be to adopt new regulation before the big
collisions happen. Another weakness is that there would be ad-
ditional costs because the ICAO model would require more
technology and operations. Finally, the major problem with this
option would be the difficulty of organizing and adopting new
international law on space debris regulation. Unfortunately, that
may happen after major outer space collisions and the conse-
quent urgency to remedy the debris problem that would follow a
disaster.
c. Evaluation: Option of Using the ICAO Model for Space
Debris Regulation161
It is generally agreed that the space debris problem is univer-
sal. It requires action and decisiveness for its resolution. ICAO is
constantly faced with resolving aviation safety issues and regulat-
ing air space. ICAO, as a UN sub-agency, is within the UN um-
brella of specialized agencies. Space has similarities to air space.
Most of air space is not sovereign. Outer space is also not sover-
eign. ICAO has proven successful in organizing and resolving
joint use of air space by all the states. Using the ICAO model to
160 Catastrophes can be strong motivators. In 1956, the Grand Canyon mid-air
collision of two large passenger airplanes convinced the United States to adopt
new laws to exercise air traffic control. See Jennifer Oldham, Crash Set a New
Course, LA TIMES (June 3, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/03/lo-
cal/me-aircrash3? [https://perma.cc/PAR8-45MY].
161 Compare use of ICAO model option for establishment of outer space traffic
standards and procedures in Larsen, Space Traffic, supra note 32.
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form a similar world safety organization for outer space debris
should be considered. ICAO regulations are mandatory and uni-
form. International space debris regulations also need to be
mandatory and uniform. ICAO regulation is accepted and even
appreciated by military users as being of a technical nature. A
similar arrangement should work for space debris regulation. A
commission of space debris experts would be charged with draft-
ing international space debris regulations. The space commis-
sion would be able to constantly evaluate the success of existing
regulations and be able to make adjustments and improvements
as needed. The space debris commission would prepare regula-
tions for generation of new debris. It should also establish ac-
ceptable regulations for significant removal of existing debris
sufficient to stabilize, if not reduce, the existing debris
accumulation.
A small representative space debris council would be formed
to approve the draft regulations. The mandatory space debris
regulations would be sent to states, who would be able to file
necessary individual deviations as occurs with aviation standards
and procedures. The council would be guided by long term pol-
icies established by an assembly of states. Such an assembly of
ICAO member states meets every three years. A similar assembly
would establish long term policy for the space debris
organization.
For its work on new regulations, a new space navigation com-
mission would need substantial input of information from the
users of outer space about their needs, evaluations of regula-
tions that are successful and beneficial, and their negative reac-
tion to regulations that do not work and are too restrictive.
Users of outer space should be able to contribute technology,
both for mitigation of new debris and for effective ways of re-
moving old debris.
The actual implementation of the new regulations would oc-
cur through the states themselves. They and their authorized
non-governmental users would have to comply with the interna-
tional regulations. The burden of actual removal of old debris
would fall on the states, unless states in the debris organization
agree to contract out debris removal to commercial companies.
New international law would be established by a diplomatic
conference to authorize the space organization and to detail its
duties. The organization would be funded by the member states
the same way ICAO is presently funded.
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2. ITU Model Option162
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is also a
sub-agency of the United Nations.163 It regulates radio frequen-
cies.164 Satellites depend on the use of radio frequencies to re-
ceive and send data, as well as for their navigation.165 Only clear
frequencies can be relied upon. In accordance with Article 4(3)
of the ITU Constitution, ITU adopts uniform international stan-
dards so that users may have clear frequencies without radio in-
terference.166 The standards are prepared by the ITU
Telecommunication Sector, which adopts the standards in
global assemblies of all the ITU member states. Applying the
agreed standards is the function of the small ITU Radio Regula-
tions Board. It assigns radio frequencies for transmission of data
to individual satellites in their related orbital slots.167 The ITU
standards apply only to civilian uses of radio frequencies. ITU
Constitution Article 48 provides that military users need only
comply with the civilian regulations “so far as possible.”168 Never-
theless, military users tend to observe civilian regulations for rea-
sons of safety and international uniformity.
a. Strengths of Using the ITU Model
The ITU model provides extensive international participation
in the establishment of regulations. Thus, adoption of standards
and regulations using the ITU model would be in the nature of
an enlarged COPUOS assembly. The international telecommu-
nication regulations have the status of treaties and are binding
and enforceable on individual members in the regular interna-
tional assemblies. Similarly, the space debris standards would
have the force of independent treaties thus making the Radio
Regulations Board an executive agency.
b. Weaknesses
Adoption of ITU regulations by states as treaty obligations can
be slow. That causes difficulty in decision-making because of the
need for majority votes in ITU World Assemblies, which are
162 See ITU Constitution, supra note 5.
163 Id. art. 2.
164 Id. art. 1.
165 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 205.
166 ITU Constitution, supra note 5, art. 4(3).
167 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 205.
168 ITU Constitution, supra note 5, art. 48.
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cumbersome. Administration of detailed space debris regula-
tions by the ITU model would be difficult. It has happened that
some states have not adopted the latest ITU regulations and
thus remain bound by the old regulations adopted by previous
assemblies.169 That creates a lack of uniformity of regulations.
The same could be true when using the ITU model for space
debris. While the ITU model would be slower than the ICAO
model, the ITU model would be better than COPUOS because
it would be more comprehensive, decisive, and enforceable.
There would be new costs because the ITU model would entail
new activities. As with the ICAO model, a major problem with
this option would be the difficulty of organizing and adopting
new international law on space debris regulation, which may not
happen until after major outer space collisions and consequent
urgency.
c. Evaluation: Option of Using the ITU Model for Space
Debris Regulation
Using the ITU model would establish a separate international
space debris organization as a sub-agency of the United Nations.
A space debris organization and its functions would have to be
authorized by new international treaties which would be funded
by its members. Its task would be to establish mandatory space
debris regulations to mitigate new debris caused by future
launches, as well as to mandate removal of existing debris. The
main difference from the ICAO model would be that an assem-
bly of states would meet regularly to direct a commission of
space debris experts in the same way that an ITU world assembly
meets to make decisions on radio frequencies.
Comparing these two options for an independent space deb-
ris organization, the option of the ICAO model would be a
stronger organization. The option of the ITU model would be
less costly.
E. REGULATION OF SPACE DEBRIS BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATORS
The non-governmental (commercial) operators of space traf-
fic do not wish to “choke off the commercial space revolu-
tion.”170 These operators have formed the Space Data
169 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 26, at 207.
170 Butt, supra note 4. The author mentions that the 2016 total world space
economy exceeded $320 billion and is vital to the world’s economic wellbeing. Id.
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Association to share information about traffic conditions in
outer space.171 The Association includes many commercial oper-
ators; it also includes major space manufacturers, such as
Airbus.172 It also includes space agencies such as NASA and the
German space agency Deutsches Zentrum fu¨r Luft- und
Raumfahrt (DLR), but military operators are not included.173
Like IADC, the Space Data Association has formed several sub-
groups on common issues such as safety, radio frequency inter-
ference, product development, and product operations.
Furthermore, the Association has access to the civilian tracking
information of the SSN.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is
another non-governmental, standard-setting international or-
ganization.174 Standards are adopted by consensus of ISO mem-
bers.175 ISO currently requires space objects to satisfy their
mission performance requirements during the complete life cy-
cle.176 Thus, the ISO requires space objects to comply with the
construction standards contained in the IADC Space Debris Mit-
igation Guidelines, if so required by the launching state of regis-
try. However, ISO is not involved in debris removal, deorbits, or
enforcement.
1. Strengths
The commercial users of outer space favor space debris regu-
lations that will benefit their movements and existence in outer
space. They need regulation and reduction of space debris that
threatens to damage or destroy their assets in outer space. Thus,
they have the incentive and self-interest in space debris regula-
tion because it is good for business. The major advantage of this
option is that it would require no new international law. It could
be based on existing cooperative activities among non-govern-
171 See SPACE DATA ASSOCIATION, http://www.space-data.org/sda [https://per
ma.cc/E2GG-L2FP].
172 Participants, SPACE DATA ASSOCIATION, http://www.space-data.org/sda
[https://perma.cc/98BA-RJ8S].
173 Id.




176 Int’l Org. for Standardization, Space Systems—Programme Management; Part 2:
Product Assurance, ISO 14300-2:2002, (July 1, 2002), https://www.sis.se/api/docu-
ment/preview/899666/ [https://perma.cc/7H2P-N5NA].
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mental operators, and it would have the approval and coopera-
tion of the commercial operators.
2. Weaknesses
Non-governmental operators want freedom to do business for
profit. They want to remove interferences with doing business.
However, they want minimum regulation that would influence
their motivation for international space debris regulation. Past
experiences with the private sector regulating safety obstacles to
their operations have proven problematic. In international mar-
itime commerce, a non-governmental standard-setting organiza-
tion, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), was established
in 1862 to establish standards for ship construction and opera-
tion, including protection of ships from collisions.177 Ships are
inspected and classified by ABS for their degree of compliance
with the ABS safety standards.178 The standards are linked to the
requirements of the Load Line Convention, the Safety of Life at
Sea Convention, and the Marine Pollution Convention.179
Thousands of ABS examiners are employed and widely em-
ployed for the classification of ships. The effectiveness and repu-
tation of the ABS is at stake whenever a major ship is lost at sea.
An example is the wreck of the oil tanker Prestige in 2002.180 The
ABS had determined the ship compliant with regulations and
thus safe; however, the ship was not seaworthy.181 Safety ques-
tions have arisen in similar cases. Industry regulation of its own
safety brings into question the Latin maxim quis custodiet ipsos
custodes (can the police be trusted to police its own abuses?).
This raises concerns with the non-governmental operators’ regu-
lation of space debris. Can they adequately pursue business
objectives and exercise control of public and private safety at the
same time? Enforcement would also be a problem for non-gov-
ernmental operators’ regulation of space debris. They would
not have the police power necessary for mandatory enforcement
of non-governmental regulation. Such regulation might also en-
177 See American Bureau of Shipping, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
American_Bureau_of_Shipping [https://perma.cc/D86H-34X9].
178 Id.
179 See International Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857,
640 U.N.T.S. 133; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1,
1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2; Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Aug. 30, 1975, 1046 U.N.T.S.
120.
180 See American Bureau of Shipping, supra note 177.
181 Id.
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counter legal problems with anti-competitive and anti-trust gov-
ernmental regulations.
3. Evaluation: Non-Governmental Operators’ Regulation of Space
Debris
Non-governmental entities would like to be able to operate
without any restriction in outer space. At the same time, they
want their investments in outer space to be safe. They can coor-
dinate some outer space activities, but they also compete with
each other. Their motivation for competition and profit con-
flicts with and is sometimes stronger than their motivation for
safety.182 Furthermore, they would not be able to establish
mandatory regulations or enforce regulations without the en-
forcement of government agencies, because they cannot en-
force regulations on other private operators. Such joint and
coordinated activities could also be anti-competitive and con-
trary to government business regulation. Thus, non-governmen-
tal operators regulating space debris is not a good idea.
Nevertheless, the contribution of non-governmental opera-
tors to government regulation of space debris is very important.
Their information about whether government regulations work
efficiently and conveniently and their suggestions for improve-
ments are valuable. Such flow in regulatory information is most
conveniently provided through association of non-government
operators, rather than individually.
F. OPTION OF INCORPORATING THE IADC ACTIVITIES INTO
COPUOS TO FORM A THIRD COPUOS SUBCOMMITTEE
The creation of a special standing COPUOS subcommittee on
space debris reporting directly to the full committee would be a
way of raising the level of attention paid to space debris by estab-
lishing an expert space debris subcommittee within COPUOS.
The experts would be provided by the participating states. The
subcommittee would research ways and means of reducing
182 For example, the Swarm Technologies Co. insisted on launching very small
satellites without a permit from the FCC, in disregard of public safety. See Tim
Fernholz, Swarm May Have to Answer for Launching Satellites Without US Permission,
QUARTZ (May 1, 2018), https://qz.com/1266602/swarm-technologies-is-in-
trouble-with-the-fcc-for-unauthorized-satellite-launches/ [https://perma.cc/23SJ-
XKJR]; see also Butt, supra note 4. FCC authorization is required before launch.
However, the FCC has proposed to streamline its rules for the deployment of
small satellites. See Streamlining Licensing Procedures for Small Satellites, 83 Fed.
Reg. 24064 (proposed May 24, 2018).
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space debris and would be given the task of preparing space
debris regulations. Considering the volume of work needed, the
subcommittee might need to become a standing committee (the
IADC is in a way already acting as a de facto COPUOS working
group). Creation of a special COPUOS subcommittee on space
debris would be a way of incorporating the valuable IADC space
debris activity into the UN organization, resulting in
universality.
1. Strengths
There are several strengths created by establishing a special-
ized COPUOS subcommittee. Space debris would no longer be
a tangential problem delegated to an outside organization. It
would involve virtually all the states directly in formulating and
dealing with space debris regulations. Ideally, it would move the
IADC experts directly into the COPUOS organization, and they
would become the nucleus of a more extensive organization.
The IADC might or might not continue to exist. That would
depend on the IADC members themselves, based on their as-
sessment of the effectiveness of the new subcommittee.
Formation of the new subcommittee may not require new in-
ternational law to expedite the establishment of new guidelines.
Being quickly established, a further benefit would be that subse-
quently a more comprehensive international space debris regu-
latory agency on the ICAO model could be established by treaty.
Such an additional subcommittee could become a short-term
expedited remedy until states could manage to negotiate a long-
term permanent legal regime.
2. Weaknesses
Recommendations by COPUOS to the UNGA are adopted by
consensus of all eighty-seven states that are members of the com-
mittee.183 That means that disapproval of one state can prevent
a recommendation from being adopted. A COPUOS subcom-
mittee on space debris would merely have power to recommend
guidelines to COPUOS, which in turn could obtain UNGA ap-
proval, which would then be sent to the states for their adoption
if they so choose. The states would continue to be able to pick
those aspects of the guidelines that they favor. Thus, the result
183 U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space: Membership Evolution, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/
members/evolution.html [https://perma.cc/X9DL-EGD3].
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would not be uniform. It would be difficult to know the applica-
ble regulations in different countries. Furthermore, the states
could each determine whether to make the guidelines
mandatory. So, it is unlikely that the idea of a COPUOS subcom-
mittee on space debris would resolve the space debris problem.
It would merely be an improved remedy.
Space debris guidelines would require continuous administra-
tion, and strengthened guidelines would need to be developed
as the space debris multitude increases. It is uncertain that a
COPUOS subcommittee could manage such a high volume of
work. The COPUOS practice of adopting resolutions by consen-
sus might paralyze or slow adoption of amended guidelines. The
subcommittee might have to adopt an expedited decision-mak-
ing process.
3. Evaluation: Forming a Third COPUOS Subcommittee on Space
Debris Regulation
The creation of a special COPUOS subcommittee on space
debris could be a short-term temporary remedy for the space
debris problem because it would not require new international
law. Such a subcommittee would probably require approval of
the UNGA because it would require additional funding and ser-
vicing by UNOOSA. The subcommittee would report directly to
the full COPUOS committee. The issue of space debris would
receive more direct attention. It would not compete with other
urgent problems in the Scientific and Technology Subcommit-
tee. A subcommittee of space debris would have equal status
with the Scientific and Technology and the Legal Subcommit-
tees. The assumption would be that the new subcommittee
would contain and be propelled by the impetus behind what is
now IADC. It would probably not be a standing subcommittee,
so it would not have the ability to react immediately to dramatic
events such as sudden collisions of active satellites with debris,
but the subcommittee could and should meet more frequently
than once a year.
However, the subcommittee would only be able to recom-
mend guidelines for adoption by the full committee and ap-
proval by the UNGA. It would not be able to adopt mandatory
regulation, nor be able to supervise implementation of regula-
tions. Those functions would remain with the individual states.
Furthermore, the states would continue to be able to pick and
choose which UN recommendations to adopt and enforce.
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Thus, there would continue to be lack of international uniform-
ity of regulation.
The major appeal of this idea is that it could be adopted
much more quickly than the creation of an international debris
organization by diplomatic conference. But it would not resolve
the basic problem. It would not be the answer to the threat of
the Kessler Syndrome. In fact, it could delay facing up to the
danger stated by the Kessler Syndrome.
G. OPTION OF THE IADC COUNTRIES IMPLEMENTING AND
ENFORCING STRICTER REGULATIONS AMONG
THEMSELVES IN THE ABSENCE OF UN ACTION
The countries of the national space agencies that are IADC
members could possibly agree among themselves to adopt more
stringent space debris regulations. These countries are the ma-
jor space powers in the world. If their national policies are to
adopt stringent regulations, then these countries could easily
conclude a treaty that would control their debris production,
and their regime would set an example for the non-members.
Such an agreement, including possible joint international en-
forcement authority, would not constitute a sub-agency of the
UN. There is little probability of conflict since the IADC regula-
tions would be improved space debris regulation. Such regula-
tion would become mandatory and would be enforced by the
state parties. Regulation could also be enforced by a joint inter-
national enforcement agency.
1. Strengths
The obvious advantage of adopting stringent space debris reg-
ulation by the major space powers would be a significant reduc-
tion of space debris. The parties could coordinate with each
other through a central organization. Stricter regulation is in
the pronounced interest of these countries. Such an arrange-
ment would not be subject to the slow UN decision making and
could be executed in the short term. The individual national
space agencies could probably influence their national govern-
ments to participate in and favor the arrangement.
2. Weaknesses
There would be several weaknesses of such an arrangement.
One weakness would be duplication. There would be two debris
control regimes due to the duality of COPUOS and IADC. The
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IADC member space agencies would have to prove that their
stringent debris policies indeed represent the policies of their
home countries. Some space agencies may have difficulty con-
vincing their military departments. Because the regime would
not be universal, it would suffer from the competitive freedom
of countries which remain unregulated and become flag of con-
venience countries. Experience indicates that some non-govern-
ment operators find it to be in their commercial interest to
establish themselves in such flag of convenience countries in or-
der to enjoy a competitive advantage. If major operators chose
to move to flag of convenience countries, then the effort of
more stringent space debris regulation could be defeated.
3. Evaluation: Option of IADC Countries Implementing and
Enforcing Stricter Regulations Among Themselves in the
Absence of UN Action
The IADC is currently the best organized and most effective
antidote to space debris. The idea of agreement among the thir-
teen IADC member countries to adopt stringent debris regula-
tions among themselves would require a diplomatic conference
and new international law. Based on their common understand-
ing of the issues and their motivation, such a diplomatic action
could be taken in rather short time. It would be negotiated and
adopted outside of the UN framework by those major space
powers that are currently most likely to cause debris. Countries
planning outer space activities in the near future might be per-
suaded to join such an agreement in order to provide safety for
their outer space investments. A problem would be that some
operators would find it to their competitive advantage to regis-
ter, launch, and operate out of flag of convenience countries
outside the newly-regulated space debris area. The stringent reg-
ulations of the group of the participating countries would not
be internationally uniform and universally enforced, which
would be a defect in the system. It would divide countries into
space-adapted countries (which would be a minority) and coun-
tries that do not have outer space capability (which would be the
majority of states). Such an action by the IADC countries could
not ultimately resolve the space debris problem. That would re-
quire participation by all countries. Thus, this approach has its
detractions.
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H. SPECIAL PROBLEM OF DEBRIS CAUSED BY THE MILITARY
Military activities in outer space are growing significantly. The
United States is increasing its military capabilities.184 Other ma-
jor space powers are following suit.185 This increase has an effect
on outer space. As an example, by using anti-satellite technology
to destroy a defunct Chinese satellite in outer space in 2007, the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army generated thousands of addi-
tional debris pieces in outer space.186 Military actions in outer
space will cause more space debris. Military authorities around
the world wish to preserve the possibility of causing debris by
military action. Causing debris by military action would expedite
the Kessler Syndrome effect. Nevertheless, military authorities
need operational safety and freedom from interference in order
to operate remote sensing, communication satellites, and GNSS
satellites safely in outer space, free from possible obstacles.187
Thus, military experts advocate order in outer space.188
It is relevant for this discussion that the Chicago Convention
establishing the ICAO regulatory regime applies only to civilian
air traffic.189 Military air traffic is not subject to the Conven-
tion.190 Adoption of international standards and procedures for
aviation is considered to be a technical issue. Nevertheless, mili-
tary aviation tends to observe the civilian traffic rules. The rea-
son is that the civil aviation traffic rules are universally
standardized by ICAO. It is safest for military aviation to follow
the civilian rules. Likewise, the International Maritime Conven-
tion also applies only to civilian maritime traffic.191 Military mar-
itime traffic is not subject to the Convention and is not
regulated by IMO. But military ships also observe the civilian
traffic rules in the interest of safety. The reason is that the civil-
ian maritime traffic regulation are considered to be of a techni-
cal nature.192 The ITU legal regime also governs only civilian
184 See Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control, supra note 152, at 1.
185 Id.
186 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Missile Test, supra note 58.
187 See Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control, supra note 152, at 21.
188 Id.; see also Butt, supra note 4. The author of that article cites the com-
mander of the U.S. Strategic Command calling for establishment of regulation
and “norms” for outer space activities, adding that “‘[n]orms can serve to high-
light . . . abnormal behavior by adversaries and would be militarily useful.’” Butt,
supra note 4.
189 Chicago Convention, supra note 32, art. 3.
190 Id.
191 See IMO Convention, supra note 31, art. 1.
192 Id.
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traffic. Furthermore, Article 48 of the ITU Convention states
that military traffic need only comply with the ITU civilian traf-
fic “so far as possible.”193 Likewise, there is much outer space
military communication, and it tends to observe civilian traffic
rules as much as possible for the sake of safety and in order to
avoid radio interference. Thus, satellite telecommunication is
treated basically as a technical issue. To this end, military com-
munication satellites tend to register their locations and radio
frequencies with ITU just to avoid radio interference.
It is strongly recommended that regulation of outer space
debris be based on the long, successful ICAO, IMO, and ITU
experiences in providing technical civilian standards and proce-
dures for air, sea, and outer space communication. This recom-
mendation is based on the assumption that these are technical
and not political issues. The existing IADC guidelines are cur-
rently established by civilian space agencies in IADC and submit-
ted as such to COPUOS. They are adopted by COPUOS,
approved by the UNGA, and adopted by the individual coun-
tries as mandatory regulations. The military users follow suit just
as they do with the international aviation, maritime, and tele-
communication rules. That leaves the military authorities in the
position of following the civilian space debris regulation “so far
as possible,” as ordained by the ITU Constitution.194
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The escalating space debris problem is a danger that must be
faced as soon as possible in order to avoid foreclosure of access
to outer space. Because of the continuing growth of debris, re-
medial action taken now will be more effective than remedial
actions in the future.
Growing space debris is both a national and an international
issue. Enforcement of international guidelines and regulations
is concentrated at the national level. However, outer space, be-
ing non-sovereign, requires comprehensive international regula-
tion. It is agreed195 that the IADC guidelines are insufficient to
stop the growth. Extensive coordination is necessary. At the mo-
ment the main impetus is with the IADC. It is actively studying
the space debris problem and coordinating the response.
COPUOS follow-up and implementation is also important, but it
193 Id. art. 48.
194 Id.
195 See supra Section IV.
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depends on IADC initiatives. The IADC and COPUOS efforts,
while admirable, are insufficient. For the present, in the absence
of more effective efforts and remedies, they offer some restraint
on debris generation.
COPUOS is only able to produce voluntary guidelines. A
problem is that these guidelines are not uniformly applied and
enforced. Thus, space debris guidelines are not the ultimate so-
lution. It is necessary to establish an international organization
that can develop and establish mandatory standards and proce-
dures for both new launches and for debris. ICAO has proven to
be the best model for establishing, administering, and supervis-
ing international mandatory regulations applied and executed
by the individual states. Developing an organization like ICAO
would require new international laws to be established by a dip-
lomatic conference. It took three years for the ICAO organiza-
tion to become fully operational. If the ICAO model is chosen,
an interim organization may well be required until full status is
achieved. The new organization would become responsible for
dealing with the Kessler Syndrome and preventing foreclosure
of access to outer space. Space debris escalation demands that
the long-term solution of adopting the ICAO model should be-
gin at once.
IADC members, in particular ESA and NASA, have concluded
that the IADC guidelines cannot possibly resolve the space deb-
ris crisis. The IADC states could reasonably be expected to take
the initiative to form a global space debris decision-making or-
ganization capable of resolving the approaching crisis in outer
space. IADC expertise could reasonably be expected to become
an essential part of a new organization. Prospects of the alterna-
tive future makes such initiative almost imperative.
In addition, the diplomatic conference establishing new inde-
pendent regulatory organization for space debris should con-
sider the following two issues: ownership of space debris and
liability for space debris damages.
A. OWNERSHIP OF SPACE DEBRIS
Space debris can be legally construed to be space objects and
thus subject to the ownership laws of the state on whose registry
a space object is launched.196 It is necessary to change current
international laws on ownership of debris. That would enable
196 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. VIII.
2018] SOLVING THE SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS 519
any states and possibly a new organization to begin to remove
the largest and most dangerous space debris.
Incidental to this change, it is also advisable to clarify the issue
of whether and to what extent states are obligated by the Regis-
tration Convention to register debris. There should be an obli-
gation on launching operators and states to register known
space objects so that they can be identified and thus avoided.
Registration would be an acknowledgement recognizing and ac-
cepting responsibility for the consequences of space debris.
B. LIABILITY FOR SPACE DEBRIS DAMAGES
Finally, Article II of the Liability Convention provides that
states are only liable for outer space collisions if the victim is
able to prove fault of the launching state. This Article should be
changed. Making states absolutely liable for their identifiable
space debris would be a useful deterrent to creating debris.197
That should also be concluded at the diplomatic conference.
197 Operators and launchers of space objects could be required to post a space
debris bond prior to launches that would compensate for space debris damages
caused by failure of deorbit or graveyard disposal of space objects. Polluter Pays,
supra note 60.
